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The discussion here will be limited to intergovernmental organizations. The
topic is timely, for there remain ambiguities regarding the accountability of such
organizations to their members or third parties, or the accountability of the
members of these organizations and third parties to the organizations, and the
necessary mechanisms and procedures to ensure such accountability.
The issues this topic raises have been subjected to recent scrutiny and debate
by international lawyers,' but more scholarly analysis is needed to clarify the
issues further and provide firm guidelines for action. First, however, we must
distinguish between accountability, responsibility, and legal liability. The
definitions are not clear. Second, as the mandate and the role of international
organizations (1Os), and thus the range and scope of their activities, differ among
them, these variables must be considered in determining their accountability.
Third, we must answer broadly the question, "accountability to whom?" Those
addressed should include lOs and their staff, both member-states and non-
members, international and domestic courts, national parliaments,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private parties (including legal
persons). Fourth, we need to further explore the existing mechanisms and
procedures for holding international organizations accountable and, as required,
new mechanisms and procedures should be fashioned. And, finally, we need to
consider perhaps the most difficult issue: who can and should determine the
question of the validity of the U.N. Security Council's actions? And, assuming the
action is deemed to have exceeded the Security Council's mandate and powers,
can it be invalidated-by whom and with what outcomes?
Let me illustrate the controversies and ambiguities that abound as we study
this subject. Questions have arisen about the accountability, responsibility, and
legal liability of the United Nations or its constituent organs, such as the Security
Council, the U.N. member states, and individuals for alleged violations of human
rights and humanitarian law regarding U.N. peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and
peace-building operations, as well as economic sanctions imposed by the Security
* John Evans University Professor, Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and Director, International
Legal Studies Program, University of Denver. This is an adapted version of an address presented at the
International Law Association-American Branch's International Law Weekend in New York, October
2004.
1. Recent studies have been undertaken by the International Law Association and the American
Society of International Law, and the International Law Commission has the topic on its agenda for
consideration.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Council. Who is responsible and to what extent for tortious acts? Privileges and
immunities accorded to the United Nations are implicated. However, normally,
prior to the commencement of such operations, the United Nations also negotiates
a more comprehensive agreement on privileges and immunities directly with each
host state.
Similar questions have been raised concerning alleged ordinary tort and
breach of contract claims as well as claims related to alleged human rights
violations against other 1Os. Also, critics of globalization continue to demonstrate
and shout that there is a lack of openness and transparency in World Trade
Organization (WTO) decisionmaking, especially its dispute resolution
mechanisms, which they find undemocratic and unacceptable. The arbitration
process and its outcomes in investor disputes in the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) setting under its chapter 11, which have been subjects of
discussion in several recent international law conferences, have been similarly
denounced for the lack of transparency in NAFTA's decisionmaking, especially its
dispute resolution processes.
In this address, I will confine my remarks first to addressing briefly the U.N.
issues pertaining to peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peace-building, and
economic sanctions; next, to commenting on the accountability of other
international organizations; and finally, to reporting on the recently concluded
study of the International Law Association on the subject.
II. THE U.N.-RELATED ACTIVITIES
A. U.N. Peacekeeping and Enforcement Operations
In the aftermath of the Cold War, as the U.N. peacekeeping operations
expanded in size, scope, and diversity of functions they perform, the application of
international humanitarian law to such operations is increasingly recognized as
necessary and important. The United Nations acknowledged this necessity by
entering into status of forces agreement with the host state Rwanda in 1993,
Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda,
under which the "principles and spirit" of the pertinent international human rights
instruments, inter alia, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the two Additional
Protocols of 1977 to these conventions, and the Hague Convention on the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954 are to be
fully respected by U.N. forces.
2
2. Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, Nov. 5, 1993,
U.N.-Rwanda, 1748 U.N.T.S. 3. The four conventions are: Convention [I] For the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Convention [II] For the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick or Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention [III]
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug, 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. 135;
Convention [IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The two Protocols are: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 Aug 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug 1949 and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
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The United Nations entered into similar status of forces agreements in its
subsequent peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. This broad statement,
that of fully respecting the "principles and spirit" of the norms, needed further
elaboration since there were no guidelines on how to translate it to address
practical issues such as the legal status of combatants and other detainees by U.N.
forces, the kind of weapons permissible and prohibited to use, and the legal status
of U.N. forces who might be taken as hostages. In 1995, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) brought together experts to address these
challenges and presented to the U.N. Secretariat a draft of basic norms of
international humanitarian law to be applied to peacekeeping and enforcement
activities.
Based upon the ICRC work, the U.N. Secretary-General issued the Bulletin on
the Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law on
August 6, 1999, which came into force six days later.3 The Bulletin is "applicable
to United Nations forces conducting operations under Untied Nations command
and control," 4 and specifies provisions of international humanitarian law that
would be respected by the United Nations. Its principles apply to U.N. forces when
they are actively engaged in situations of armed conflicts as combatants "to the
extent and for the duration of their engagement," and engaged in "enforcement
actions, or in peace-keeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-
defense." 5
There are still ambiguities in the application of these guidelines. For example,
the Bulletin does not differentiate between U.N. operations undertaken in
peacekeeping activities and those in enforcement. Also, it does not differentiate
between the peacekeepers' status "as civilians" and "as combatants." Even more
important, as the Bulletin applies to forces under U.N. command and control, they
are not applicable to U.N. "Associated Personnel," or those operations authorized
by the United Nations but conducted under national or regional command. In the
latter setting, the concerned states or regional organizations responsible for the
operations are to ensure that international humanitarian law is applied.
As to the remedies available to the one seeking damages arising out of the
U.N. peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations, or post-conflict U.N.
operations aimed at peace-building, it should first be noted, that the United Nations
and its officials working in official capacity are granted "functional immunity"
from legal process. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations6 limits the privileges and immunities of the U.N. officials to those
"necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the
Organization." However, under one of the provisions of the Convention, when the
U.N.T.S. 609.
3. Secretary-General's Bulletin, Observance by United Nations Forces of International
Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doe. ST/SGB/1999/13 (1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1656 (1999).
4. Id. § 1.2.
5. Id. §1.1.
6. U.N. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 21
U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 16.
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United Nations or one of its officials enjoying immunity is a party to a dispute of a
private-law character, the United Nations is obliged to provide for appropriate
means of settlement in such a dispute.
As the United Nations undertook an expanded role for peacekeeping and
enforcement operations, the need to limit U.N. financial obligations arose. The
triggering event was a claim by Bosnia and Herzegovina against the United
Nations for $70 million, most of it for damage caused by U.N. vehicles for the
normal use of roads and bridges, etc. Concerned about the impact of such claims
on the financial health of the organization, the General Assembly adopted a
resolution calling upon the Secretary-General to explore ways to limit U.N.
liability vis-a-vis third parties.8 The limitations established were both financial and
temporal.9 Regarding financial limitation, compensation for personal injury, illness
or death must not exceed the amount of fifty-thousand dollars. Compensation for
property loss or damage was also set at a reasonable level to be measured by costs
of repair or replacement of the property damaged, or fair rental value or repair
costs. 10 However, the United Nations is entitled to seek reimbursement from the
members of the force or from the state contributing troops." Also, the host country
in whose territory a peacekeeping operation is undertaken gives consent for such
an operation and is hence assumed to share with the United Nations the burden of
financial claims the U.N. peacekeepers' presence may cause. The temporal limit
was set at six months.
In case of "operational necessity," which is analogized to "military necessity,"
the United Nations assumes no tortious liability. Regarding the damage caused by
gross negligence or willful misconduct on the part of the United Nations, the
Organization assumes liability for full compensation.
B. Post-conflict U.N. Operations
It is generally accepted that the post-conflict U.N. operations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Bosnia), Rwanda, Somalia, and Mozambique, among others, and
territorial administrations from Cambodia to Kosovo and East Timor, have
suffered from excesses and serious human rights violations and abuses allegedly
committed by peacekeepers. Questions have been raised about the lack of U.N.
accountability for such violations. The situations in Bosnia and Kosovo will be
briefly mentioned here.
7. Id. art. 29
8. See Gen. Ass. Res. 50/235, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 49. Vol. 2, at 33, U.N. Doc.
A/50/49 (1996); Gen. Ass. Res. 51/13 (1996).
9. For a detailed analysis, see Daphna Shraga, CURRENT DEVELOPMENT: UN Peacekeeping
Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-
Related damage, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 406, 410-12 (2000).
10. See Report of the Secretary-General, Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing
of the United Nations' Peacekeeping Operations: Financing of the United Nations' Peacekeeping
Operations, U.N. Doc. A/51/903 (1997), paras. 30-36.
11. For a Model Contribution Agreement between the U.N. and the state contributing resources to
the U.N. peacekeeping operations, see Note by the Secretary-General, Reform of the Procedures for
Determining Reimbursement to Member States for Contingent-Owned Equipment, U.N.Doc. A/50/995,
annex (1996), art. 9.
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In Bosnia the U.N. civilian police have been accused of participation in the
trafficking of women-buying and selling women, conspiring with criminal groups
to recruit and smuggle women into brothels, and patronizing brothels in which
trafficked women were abused. 12 There was no accountability for these human
rights violations on the part of individual peacekeepers, peacekeeper-contributing
states, or the United Nations itself.'3
Similarly, in Kosovo, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
allegedly abusing his authority was accused of continuing to use Executive Orders
to unlawfully detain suspected criminals. 14 Although an ombudspersons' office,
aimed at promoting and protecting "the rights and freedoms of individuals and
legal entities,"' 5 was established, it had limited jurisdiction over the U.N. Kosovo
force and institutional checks were inadequate to ensure effective protection of
human rights.' 6 Accountability was lacking.
C. Economic Sanctions Imposed by the Security Council
17
Economic sanctions are considered a blunt but nonetheless necessary
instrument,' s aimed at modifying the target state's behavior. However, as is
evidenced by the adverse impact of economic sanctions on the vulnerable civilian
population in Iraq-malnourishment and increased fatalities among children,
women and the elderly-it is often not the regime, but those weakest in societies
who suffer the most. This has led to deep concern about the use and impact of
economic sanctions expressed by not only NGOs, especially human rights groups
12. See Jennifer Murray, Note: Who Will Policy Peace-Builders? The failure to Establish
Accountability for the Participation of U.N. Civilian Police in the Trafficking of Women in Post-
Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, 34 COLUM. HUM RTs. L. REV. 475, 477 and nn. 10-12, 503 no. 150-
58 (2003).
13. See id. at 505-06 and nn. 159-64.
14. See Elizabeth Abraham, Comment: The Sins of the Savior: Holding the United Nations
Accountable to International Human Rights Standards for Executive Order Detentions in its Mission in
Kosovo, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1291, 1296 n. 17 (2003).
15. See On the Establishment of Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, UN MIK Regulation
2000/38, at 1.1 (June 30, 2000).
16. See generally Abraham, supra note 14, at 1322-37.
17. For an insightful analysis, see August Reinisch, Note and Comment: Developing Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic
Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 851 (2001)
18. In his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
acknowledged that an economic sanction is a "blunt instrument," Supplement to an Agenda for Peace,
U.N. Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, para. 66 (1995). Hence he called for providing humanitarian assistance to
the potential victims of economic sanctions and, prior to the imposition of such sanctions, to undertake
their impact assessment. Id. para. 70.
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and human rights activists and scholars, 19 but by the United Nations, U.N. organs
and U.N.-related agencies as well, arguing that economic sanctions adversely
affect human rights of civilians in targeted states.
For example, the General Assembly had started adopting resolutions critical
of "unilateral coercive economic measures" in 1989.2° In 2000, the U.N. Human
Rights Commission's Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights adopted a resolution suggesting that the Security Council permit the import
of food, medical, and pharmaceutical supplies in Iraq.21 The same year a working
paper prepared for the Sub-Commission criticized the U.N. sanctions against Iraq
as "unequivocally illegal" under existing international human rights law and
humanitarian law.22 Also, the monitoring body for the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, its Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, has expressed concern in its general comments about the impact of
economic sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights.23
The two pertinent questions for discussion here are: (1) while imposing
economic sanctions, what is the accountability of the Security Council to comply
with international human rights law and international humanitarian law? and (2)
what remedies and what mechanisms for the settlements of disputes are available
to the civilian victims of these sanctions?
Regarding the accountability of the Security Council, a literal interpretation of
the U.N. Charter does not provide a clear answer to the question raised about the
obligation of the Security Council to be bound by general international law while it
takes action to maintain or restore international peace and security under its
Chapter VII powers. While the Charter specifies no explicit limitations on the
Security Council's powers acting under Chapter VII, one could argue that the
activities undertaken by the Security Council must be in accord with the purposes
and principles of the U.N. Charter as contained in Article I, combined with the
human rights provisions in the Charter (Preamble, and Articles 1 and 55).
19. See, e.g., Felicia Swindlls, Note: U.N. Sanctions in Haiti: A Contradiction under Articles 41
and 55 of the U.N. Charter, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1878 (1997); Joy K. Fausey, COMMENT, Does
the United Nations' Use of Economic Sanctions to Protect Human Rights Violate its own Human Rights
Standards, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 193 (1994); Rene Provost, Starvation as a Weapon: Legal Implications
of the United Nations Food Blockage Against Iraq and Kuwait, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 577
(1992).
20. The first General Assembly resolution criticizing unilateral coercive economic measures was
G.A. Res. 44/215, Dec 22, 1989.
21. U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, Human Rights and Humanitarian Consequences of Sanctions Including Embargoes,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/1 (2000).
22. See U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment of Human Rights,
U.N. Doc. ECN.4/Sub.2/2000/33 para. 6 (2000). [hereinafter Working Paper].
23. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Economic Rights, The Relationship Between
Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GENERAL COMMENT 8,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12-1997/8; U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health, GENERAL COMMENT 14, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000).
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Also, one could make a sound argument that as the United Nations is a
subject of international law, one of its main organs, the Security Council, must
itself be subject to international law, including customary international law and
general principles. Granted that the United Nations, like other international
organizations, is not bound by treaty law to comply with human rights and
humanitarian law because none of these organizations is a party to any human
rights law treaty or humanitarian law treaty. However, in imposing economic
sanctions, the Security Council and its Sanctions Committee cannot derogate from
those international law norms that have acquired the status ofjus cogens, and must
as well comply with customary international law and general principles,
embodying human rights and humanitarian law norms.
Based upon these arguments, the Security Council must ensure that its
imposition of economic sanctions does not adversely affect the enjoyment of
human rights of people in the targeted states. For the Security Council and the
Sanctions Committee which administers sanctions, specific human rights norms
include the right to life, the right to health, and the right to an adequate standard of
living, including the basic human needs such as food, clothing, housing, and
medical care. These norms are contained in several human rights instruments,
primarily among them the International Bill of Human Rights-the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the two covenants, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.
Regarding compliance with international humanitarian law, it should be noted
at the onset that the instruments embodying the pertinent international
humanitarian norms-the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two
Additional Protocols of 1977-apply only in the context of armed conflict and do
not explicitly address economic sanctions. However, as the civilian population's
protection underlies international humanitarian law, humanitarian law norms could
be considered applicable to limit the use of economic sanctions.24
Discussion regarding compensation for damages caused by economic
sanctions imposed by the Security Council have occurred only in the context of
Article 50 of the U.N. Charter, under which any state "confronted with special
economic problems arising from the carrying out of [preventive or enforcement
measures taken by the Security Council] shall have the right to consult the Security
Council with regard to a solution of those problems., 25 However, the working
paper on sanctions mentioned above recommended that claims for damages be
brought before national courts, U.N. or regional human rights organizations, or
even the International Court of Justice. 6 Although there are procedural difficulties
24. For a detailed discussion of both the application of human rights and humanitarian norms, see
Reinisch, supra note 17, at 860-63.
25. See id. at 864.
26. See Working Paper, supra note 22, para. 106
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in invoking the jurisdiction of any of these bodies, especially the International
Court of Justice, we need to explore all available alternatives including mediation
and arbitration. 27 This recommendation applies equally to claims for damages
caused by U.N. peacekeepers.
III. OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Just as the United Nations enjoys immunity from jurisdiction, most other
international organizations enjoy similar immunity. I will illustrate this point by
referring to arguments before the European Court of Human Rights that a domestic
court had violated the European Convention on Human Rights by granting
immunity from suit to an international organization, the European Space Agency
(ESA).25
The applicants had brought the section before the European Court after their
petition to the European Commission, based on the argument that the German
courts had denied them access to a court to resolve their dispute with the ESA,
which was their right under German labor law. They were actually employees of a
number of British, Irish, French, and Italian companies who had been working for
several years at the European Space Operation Center in Germany at the behest of
their actual employers. Before the German courts they had sought recognition that
pursuant to the applicable German labor laws, they had acquired the status of
employees of the ESA. The German courts had dismissed their actions on the
ground that ESA was immune from jurisdiction pursuant to the ESA Convention.
The European Court first interpreted the pertinent provision of the European
Convention implicated, Article 6(l), which provides: "In the determination of his
civil rights and obligations against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law." The Court recognized that this article "embodied the right to a
court" and went on to determine whether the German courts' decisions to dismiss
their actions were sufficient to secure the applicants' right to a court.
The Court found no violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention, based upon
its twin reasonings. Initially, it said that to ensure the proper functioning of
international organizations so that they could be free from interference by
individual governments, the immunity from suit enjoyed by international
organizations was a legitimate purpose in restricting the right of access to court.
Second, the Court held that "a material factor in determining whether granting
ESA immunity from German jurisdiction is permissible" was whether "the
applicants had available to them reasonable alternative means to protect effectively
their rights under the Convention." Since the ESA Appeals Board, which has
jurisdiction "to hear disputes relating to any explicit or implicit action taken by the
27. See Reinisch, supra note 17, at 863-69 for a thoughtful discussion on remedies for victims of
U.N. sanctions.
28. See August Reinisch, INTERNATIONAL DECISION: Waite and Kennedy v. Germany
Application No. 26083/94; Beer and Regan v. Germany, Application No 28934/945. European Court of
Human Rights, Feb. 18, 1999, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 933 (1999). For a detailed discussion, see id. at 933-
38.
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Agency and arising between it and staff members," provided an adequate
alternative forum, the Court found that the test of proportionality, that is, that there
be a reasonable relationship between the means employed and the goal sought to
be accomplished, was met.
IV. 2004 REPORT OF THE ILA COMMITTEE ON THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 29
In May 1996, the ILA established a committee with the mandate: "to consider
what measures (legal, administrative or otherwise) should be adopted to ensure the
accountability of public international organizations to their members and to third
parties, and of members and third parties to such organizations., 30 After eight
years of work the committee presented its final report in 2004 at the ILA's Berlin
Conference, in which it discussed lOs at three levels:
[First level] the extent to which international organizations, in the fulfillment of
their functions as established in their constituent instruments, are and should be
subject to, or should exercise, forms of internal and external scrutiny and
monitoring, irrespective of potential and subsequent liability and/or
responsibility;
[Second level] tortious liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts or
omissions not involving a breach of any rule of international and/or institutional
law (e.g. environmental damage as a result of lawful nuclear or space activities);
[Third level] responsibility arising out of acts or omissions which do constitute a
breach of a rule of international and/or institutional law (e.g. violations of human
rights, or humanitarian law, breach of contract, gross negligence, or as far as
institutional law is concerned acts of organs which are ultra vires or violate the
law of employment relations).
3 1
29. The report, presented at the 2004 Berlin Conference of the ILA, can be found at
http://www.ila-hq.org/html/layout-committee.htm. Members of the Committee were: Chair Sir Franklin
Berman (UK), Co-Rapporteur Professor Malcolm Shaw (UK), Co-Rapporteur Professor Karel Wellens
(Netherlands), Mr. Dapo Akande (UK), Mr. Tal Becker (Israel), Dr. Niels Blokker (Netherlands), Mr.
Daniel B. Bradlow (USA), Judge Carl-August Fleischhauer (Germany), Professor Vera Gowlland-
Debbas (UK), Dr. Gavan Griffith (Australia), Judge P.H. Kooijmans (Netherlands), Dr. Edward
Kwakwa (HQ), Professor Tiya Maluwa (HQ), Professor Ved P. Nanda (USA), Professor Ki-Gab Park
(Korea), Dr. Mieczyslaw Paszkowski (Poland), Professor August Reinisch (Austria), Professor David
Ruzie (France), Dan Sarooshi (UK), Professor Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte (Germany), Professor Erik
Suy (Belgium-Luxembourg), Professor Jerzy Sztucki (Sweden), Professor Toshiya Ueki (Japan), and
Dr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina (HQ). Alternates: Ms. Rae Lindsay, Dr. Wolfgang Munch, and Professor
N.D. White.
The Committee had earlier presented its reports in 1998 at the Taipei ILA Conference, in 2000 at its
London Conference, and in 2002 at its New Delhi Conference. See id. at 4.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 5-6.
2005
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The format the committee used to present its report was to provide a set of
"Recommended Rules and Practices" (RRPs) accompanied by commentaries. It
noted at the outset that the RRPs "do not necessarily reflect a legal obligation for
each 10. They are derived from common principles, objectives and notions related
to the accountability of lOs and reflect considerable practice."
32
On the first level, RRPs common to all 1Os include: the principle of good
governance (characterized by, inter alia, transparency in both the decision-making
process and the implementation of institutional and operational decisions,
participatory decision-making process, access to information, a well fumctioning
international civil service, sound financial management, and appropriate reporting
and evaluation mechanisms), the principle of good faith, the principles of
constitutionality and institutional balance, the principle of supervision and control,
the principle of stating the reasons for decisions for a particular course of action,
the principle of procedural regularity, the principle of objectivity and impartiality,
and the principle of due diligence. 33 RRPs on the relationship between 1Os and
NGOs include establishing appropriate relationships by the lOs with NGOs active
within their field of competence, including establishing an NGO liaison service
and holding briefings with their representatives.34
On the second level of accountability, addressing liability and responsibility
issues, the Committee noted first the International Court of Justice's advisory
opinion, which stated that: "international organizations are subjects of international
law, and as such are bound by any obligations incumbent on them under general
rules of international law. 35 The Committee also stated:
A transfer of powers to an 10 cannot remove acts of the 10 from the ambit of
control mechanisms established by particular treaties nor can it exclude the
responsibility of States who transferred power to an 10. States should "make
provision that a potential jurisdictional gap concerning the control of the
exercise of such transferred powers do not arise."
' 36
The Committee stated that where an IO's acts caused personal injury to state
officials or damage to state property, international law governs the tortious liability
of the 1O. As to personal injury to a non-state party or damage to such a party's
property, local law is to govern unless the activity constitutes a breach by the
organization of an applicable rule of international law. 3 7 The international
organization "should assess the potential damage" which its activities may cause;
the 1O should also take appropriate precautionary measures to prevent unnecessary
damage and should use precautionary principles before undertaking operational
activities involving a risk of causing significant harm to the environment. 31 In the
32. Id. at 9.
33. Id. at 9-18.
34. Id. at 20.
35. Id. at 21 (quoting Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and
Egypt, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1980, at 73, 90).
36. Id. at 22 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 25.
38. Id. at 25-27.
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Committee's RRP stating that 1Os "should comply with basic human rights
obligations," the commentary adds that lOs should observe basic human rights
obligations in their decisions such as "designing structural adjustment programmes
and development projects," and that in their decisions "concerning the use of force,
temporary administration of territory, imposition of coercive measures, launching
of peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations lOs should observe basic human
rights obligations and applicable principles and rules of international humanitarian
law. , ,
39
On the third level of accountability, the Committee noted the current state of
international law, which presents dilemmas in establishing a responsibility regime
for IOs. 40 However, it does provide guidelines on the international legal
responsibility of IOs. 41 It also discusses attribution of wrongful acts to lOs and
responsibilities of states for defaults or wrongful acts of an 10 and such attribution
and responsibility in situations of delegation and authorization.42
The Committee provides detailed RRPs on remedies against international
organizations. It moves from general features of remedies and the pertinent
question, "remedial action against whom?" to the potential outcome of remedial
action.43 It then discusses the procedural aspects of remedial action against IOs-
by states, staff members, and private claimants, including contractual liability
claims and tort liability claims-and claims against officials and experts.44 It
specifically states that lOs should establish an insurance mechanism to address
third-party liability claims.45 It also addresses the issue of jurisdictional immunity
of lOs and states that lOs' duties entail "an obligation to disclose information and
documents directly held by it.
' 46
The Committee discusses substantive outcomes of remedial actions by lOs
and provides guidelines on non-judicial remedial action and judicial remedial
action, specifically detailing the role of international administrative tribunals,
domestic courts, and arbitration proceedings.47 The only issue on which the
Committee was not unanimous was the role for the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).
While some members were strongly in favor of the ICJ having a role to ensure
accountability, others did not consider it to be practical or even desirable. 48 Thus,
the Committee included the proposals on the ICJ in the appendix.49
39. Id. at 27-28.
40. Id. at 31-33.
41. Id. at 33-34.
42. Id. at 34-38
43. Id. at 40-44.
44. Id at 45-49.
45. Id. at 48.
46. Id. at 51.
47. Id. at 53-59.
48. Id. at 59-60.
49. Id. 61-63.
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V. CONCLUSION
The last few years have witnessed an increasing demand and some movement
toward ensuring that lOs take concrete steps to ensure their accountability. The
work of professional and scholarly organizations such as the International Law
Association and the American Society of International Law has provided valuable
guidance on the difficult issues implicated in the accountability debate. The next
important step will be for the U.N. International Law Commission to provide a
detailed study on the subject.
